YUTOPIA

While there is no shortage of Benei Yisrael being rebuked in Tanach for their various transgressions, one such indictment which seems imprecise and perhaps overly harsh is the comparison with the people of S'dom and 'Amorah. As we know, the legacy of S'dom and 'Amorah is one of unmitigated evil and a benchmark for immorality which is used to this day. Their sins were so complete and evil so absolute that Hashem does not simply cause the cities' destruction, but completely obliterates them with unparalleled divine wrath. And yet in Eicha we are told that "the sins of the daughter of my people is greater than that of S'dom" (Eicha 4:6), and in the Haftara of Hazon the Navi exclaims "Heed the word of Hashem you leaders of S'dom, listen to the words of our God's Torah you people of 'Amorah" (Yeshayahu 1:10). Were the sins of the Jews in fact as serious and complete to warrant such comparisons with S'dom and 'Amorah?

Continue reading "9 Av, The Hurban, And The Lessons of S'dom" »

Posted by Josh at 11:50 PM | Permalink | Comments (3)

If you ever find yourself in an intellectual discussion, you might hear (or yourself use) the term "slippery slope argument." The general logic behind a "slippery slope" argument is that if we allow X, then Y would be the inevitable consequence. Since Y is obviously bad, then we shouldn't allow X. The main flaws of this logic would be irrationally assigning an extreme value to Y or by not demonstrating how X -> Y. Opponents of "slippery slopes" rarely argue the merits or demerits of the argument but instead chose to redefine the logic as it suits them. Since the reformulation is usually flawed, opponents may then use the derisive "slippery slope" label to easily discount opposing positions.

Some site maintenance pointed me to Zachary Sholem Berger's response to my review of Rabbi Steve Greenberg's book. Berger's first contention is that my position "smacks of the slippery slope argument used against same-sex marriage."

If gays can marry, why not polygamy? or incest? or bestiality? The idea, I suppose, is that homosexuality is basically the same thing as everything else outside the bounds of traditional understanding, and homosexuality is traditionally condemned for the same reason as these other activities. Neither of these is true. The same can be said of ones: homosexuality is different from adultery and murder, I should think, in important ways - namely that homosexuality is not, a priori, immoral, while adultery breaches a relationship and murder takes life.

Here, Berger imposes the issue of morality on my legal argument. His equation compares same-sex marriage with murder on moral grounds. Since there is a moral distinction between them, the laws should obviously be different. However, my critique of R. Greenberg was not based on morality, but on halakhic or legal reasoning. The difference is that laws are not abstract, but they are the rules for normative behavior to which all society must (or at least should) adhere. Jurists from the Talmud through the American Supreme Court have concerned themselves with interpreting law not only for the immediate case at hand, but also the ramifications for future cases.

In the example of oness, R. Greenberg argued that since homosexuals are born with the desire, then we should treat them in the legal category of being exempt if they commit a biblical prohibition. However, if the mere innate desire is sufficient to exempt one type of sin, then the logical consequence would be to apply that logic to other desires as well. Once all desires are outside of one's control, then all transgressions may be dismissed. This is not an issue of what is moral or immoral, but of the ramifications of assigning legal categories.

Similarly, the secular debate of homosexual marriage may be phrased in legal terms as well. Does the government have a legal right to legislate the private sexual actions of consenting individuals? If the government does, then technically, it could have the power to outlaw homosexual unions. If it does not, then by what legal right does it have to prohibit other sexual acts, such as statutory rape based on an arbitrarily decided age of consent? True, many are motivated by moral concerns, but the legal issues must still be addressed.

The other general problem I see with the immediate rejection of slippery slope arguments is the intrinsic inconsistency. Most logical arguments I have seen follow the logic of IF X THEN Y, including those positions taken by those who oppose the slippery slope arguments. For example, Berger concludes, "As a liberal Jew, however, I do sometimes feel like a passenger on a cruise ship, who asks himself, 'How much longer do we have to be swinging right on this thing?'" To which I counter, what is wrong with "swinging right" on this or any issue? Furthermore, why shouldn't we be able to discriminate against whomever we chose? If your answer would follow the logic of IF we did that THEN something would happen, you've just set up a slippery slope argument.

This is not to say that all slippery slope arguments are valid - some are clearly far fetched. However, each one must be taken at its merits and debated as it is formulated, and not as one decides to interpret them. I find it ironic that "slippery slope" arguments are often rejected because of their misleading logic, and so they are dismissed automatically based on equally misleading logic.

Berger's other issue deals more with the question of halakhic authority, one which I cannot detail yet at this point. However, I think it's time for me to just write a general summary of how Jewish Law works, or at least the concepts and rationale for why I believe what I believe.

Posted by Josh at 10:23 PM | Permalink | Comments (1)

Homosexuality and Orthodox Judaism

A few months ago, Avraham pointed me to this Forward review of Rabbi Steve Greenberg's new book Wrestling with God and Men. I wrote some preliminary thoughts based on the review, but the YUCS server crashed as I submitted it for posting. This technical glitch proved to be fortuitous in that Rabbi Greenberg visited UC later that week and I was able to talk to him personally and purchase a copy of the book. Although he still did not convince me of his arguments, he conveyed the emotional turmoil with which people live. In halakhic matters, people often ignore the human dimension involved of an issue and develop their opinions in a social vacuum. However, halakha is ultimately followed by people many of whom face difficult conflicts for a myriad of personal reasons. While personal issues alone are not sufficient to change Jewish law, we cannot ignore the tension and struggles that people face in their quest to be observant Jews.

Below is my review of Rabbi Greenberg's book, as submitted to a writing seminar.

Continue reading "Lonely Men Of Faith" »

Posted by Josh at 11:46 AM | Permalink | Comments (20)

Recently, I submitted a paper for a class titled "Theology and Mythology of Evil." The class read texts from several cultures and religions, each attempting to resolve how Evil could exist, especially in a world of an omniscient and beneficent God (or Gods as the case may be).

I noticed in the class a tendency for people to assume that there exists a particular "Jewish" attitude regarding Evil. Although this is true to some extent, the overall perception mirrors the attitude of the yeshiva - that one or two opinions believed by Jews makes the opinion "Jewish" - to the possible exclusion of everything else.

This attitude is precisely what prompted me to start the Mahshevet Hazal shiurim. With this in mind, I collected several sources from the Talmud which illustrate the plurality of opinions regarding the problem of theodicy. While retaining the multiple and often mutually exclusive positions in the Talmud, I offered my suggestions for a unified Rabbinic approach to Evil.

Continue reading "Talmudic Theodicy" »

Posted by Josh at 12:12 PM | Permalink | Comments (5)

It's time now for my response to Rabbi Daniel Stein. Sorry for the delays, but I do have schoolwork to do here. I've been working on a response that will adequately address R. Stein's points, while not succumbing to ranting. As comical and entertaining as a Grach-type review would be, I feel that R. Stein's article deserves a serious analysis and critique.

(Rants may come at the end)

Continue reading "The Stein Line" »

Posted by Josh at 11:45 AM | Permalink | Comments (5)

Although the MAPPS program offers unparalleled academic freedom, the directors of my program require one particular survey class, "Perspectives in Social Science Analysis." Over the 10 week quarter, Dr. John MacAloon and various other professors present 9 different perspectives with Dr. MacAloon presenting an overview and another scholar discussing contemporary applications of that perspective.

In week 8, we covered "Structuralism,"¹ and I was surprised to see the similarities between this perspective and " lomdus" - specifically the Brisker Derekh. There are several decent summaries of Structuralism on the web and some more on one of its main advocates Claude Lévi-Strauss.²

For those too lazy to click the links or God forbid do your own research, I'll give you the short attention span summary.⁴ Lévi-Strauss, an anthropologist, utilized aspects of linguistic theory to interpret social phenomenon beyond language.³ Linguists, like Saussure, distinguished between the words used in language and the effect, the symbol and the meaning, the langue and the parolé. How did they do this? After analyzing how speech works throughout all cultures, they realized that some phenomenon repeated themselves and they explained the different phenomenon through polar binary opposites.

Lévi-Strauss applied this methodology to social phenomenon like myths. In his work The Structural Study of Myth, Lévi-Strauss demonstrates that the Oedipus myth contains elements found in myths from other cultures. He identifies the patterns by breaking down the myth into atomic elements, and "re-structures" these elements into classifications. Once Lévi-Strauss classifies these elements into categories, he then uses his categorization to compare the Oedipus myth with similar myths. Although the categories are arbitrary, Structuralists like to formulate categories in binary opposites. E.g. symbol and meaning, personal and communal, etc.

How is this like the Brisker Derekh? Unfortunately, there isn't much directly written on the methodology of how to do "Brisk."⁵ However, I picked up a few things from my numerous years in yeshiva, and I can say that the analytical methodology is similar - though perhaps not identical.

Like structuralists, Briskers tend to explain several sources and rulings though binary comparisons. Some popular ones are heftza (object) and gavra (person), shem (name) and halos (legal status), mitzvah hiyuvi (obligatory commandment) and mitzvah kiyyumi (fulfilling a commandment), or simply "qualitative" and "quantitative" differences. Although this might apply to other areas of "lomdus" I've noticed that Briskers tend toward the binary opposites more than others. Just about every shiur I can remember from Gush involved a two-way mahloket and tannaim, amoraim, rishonim, and achronim neatly fitting into one of two arbitrary abstract categories.

Some Briskers also apply this perspective to areas of Jewish Thought. R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, perhaps the most famous descendant of the "Brisker Rav" and his tradition. In "The Lonely Man of Faith, R. Soloveitchik contrasts the personalities and religious attitudres of "Adam One" and "Adam Two" from the creation narratives. Elsewhere, R. Soloveitchik's rational "Halakhic Man" stands in opposition to the more emotional "Homo-Religiosus." Again, his thought leads him to present theological and religious ideas through manufactured binary oppositions.

Methodologically, Briskers construct and categorize the concepts in ways similar to the structuralists. Specifically, they first remove the sugya from the original context of the gemara. The sugya becomes the unit of analysis as opposed to a chapter, or even a page of talmud. Consequently, Briskers will not concern themselves with literary analysis or even finding the correct version of the talmud,⁶ because the details are not as important as the structure or the concepts. Like structuralism, these concepts are arbitrary and subject to the whim of the scholar. Unlike structuralism, yeshivas have canonized the scholars i.e. the rabbis, and therefore artificial structures become sacred and part of the "tradition."⁷

I am not surprised that the Brisker Derekh attracts so many followers, nor am I surprised at the criticisms. Structuralism can be useful, and often it may be the best method for explaining a particular data set. Critics, however, will note that as a standalone system - as an "ism" if you will - structuralism assumes and imposes too much on the data. Furthermore, in the social sciences critics will complain that structuralists remove the human participants from the analysis. Social interaction becomes a bloodless game of abstract categories with no attention to human emotions. Similarly, critics of the Brisker Derekh deride the lack of attention to detail of the sugya in its original context. Literary approaches and historical evidence may often contradict the structures imposed on the text of the talmud.

I am not going to speculate on who got what from whom. Lévi-Strauss was born and raised Jewish, and it's likely his background influenced his scholarship. I also don't think I'm saying anything radical or new here, it's just an interesting similarity I noticed in class. Take it as you will.

1. Unfortunately, the laptop was in limbo then, so I don't have typed notes from the lectures.
2. Not to be confused with the guy who made jeans.
3. See Structural Analysis in Linguistics and in Anthropology
4. I.e. don't cite this description for anything useful.
5. When I was in Gush, a small book called "The Brisker Derekh" came out and it was pretty close to a "How To Brisk." As I recall, most of the ramim and students dismissed the book as too simplistic, which was probably as good of an endorsement as it could get. At any rate, I can't find a link to it on the web.
6. The standard "Vilna" edition is loaded with errors. See Dikdukei Soferim or the Lieberman Project for other versions of the Talmud Bavli - and manuscript work is ongoing. If this sounds too heretical for you, consider that a passage may appear in several places throughout rabbinic literature (Bavli, Yerushalmi, Tosefta, Mishna, Midrash Halakha...), but there will be significant changes in their presentation. See for example, Dr. Elman's Authority and Tradition and many, many, other works.
7. For some ramifications in education, see Hakirah or Mehkar: The Religious Implications of an Historical Approach to Limmudei Kodesh by Rachel Furst and Mosheh Lichtenstein, "What Hath Brisk Wrought: The Brisker Derekh Revisited" Torah U-Madda Journal, volume 9, 1-18, 2000.

Posted by Josh at 12:04 AM | Permalink | Comments (6)

I've made some veiled references to "Theorizing Judaism." I've recently completed Dr. Martin Risebrodt's class, Theorizing Religion. Unlike typical survey classes, Dr. Riesebrodt used this class as feedback for his currently unpublished book on religion. Dr. Riesebrodt would present his ideas and one class a week would be a discussion. After he presented the main points of his thesis, the students presented examples from specific religions which may or may not have supported his thesis. In addition, we were to submit two written essays discussing the merits and flaws of his thesis. The following post will explain his thesis, and my applications of the thesis to Judaism.

Continue reading "Theorizing Judaism" »

Posted by Josh at 9:44 AM | Permalink | Comments (5)

A Not So Divine Comedy

Probably the most annoying part of attempting an ethnography of the CRC is the 2 hour commute (each way) via public transportation. On the other hand, I get to catch up on light reading. Today's entertainment comes from Rabbinic Fantasies a collection of midrashim ranging from the Rabbinic Period through R. Nachman. Specifically, I was reading about the "Alphabet of Ben Sira" which is best known for giving us the midrash of Lilith. (And not to be confused with the apocryphal book The Wisdom of Ben Sira).

It's a real shame this isn't taught in Yeshivot - this stuff is off the charts on the unintentional comedy scale. According to the book, Ben Sira was the son of Yirmayahu and his daughter, though not through incestuous means. (I'd elaborate, but this is a family blog). At any rate, Ben Sira was born with a full set of teeth, the intelligence of an adult, and the personality of Stewie from Family Guy.

I quote from pages 171-172:

"My son," said his mother to Ben Sira, "don't speak for the evil eye may fix its power on you."
"The evil eye has no authority over me. Besides, do not try to talk me out of doing what my father did. To me applies the proverb, 'The ewe takes after the ewe, and the son follows the deeds of his father.'"
"Why do you interrupt me my son?" his mother asked.
"Because you know that I'm hungry, and you give me nothing to eat."
"Here, take my breasts. Eat and drink."
"I have no desire for your breasts. Go sift flour in a vessel, knead it into fine bread, and get fatty meat and aged wine - and you can eat with me."

Awfully precocious for an infant, no? Just wait until he gets to school:

Said the teacher, "You cannot be taught, for you are still too young. Our sages of blessed memory stated, 'at the age of five years a child begins to study Bible.' (Mishna Avot 5:24)"
"But have you not learned," Ben Sira asked, "The day is short, but the work is great' (Mishna Avot 2:20)? And you tell me to sit and not to study because I am too young! In the cemetery I can see children younger than I who are dead. Who knows what will be, whether I shall live or die?"
The teacher retorted, "How dare you instruct me! Our sages of blessed memory declared, 'Whoever teaches the law in the presence of his teacher is deserving of death' (B. Berakhot 31b)."
Ben Sira replied, "You are not yet my teacher, for so far I have learned nothing from you."

So, you might be wondering, what would a child like this be when he grows up? Well, later in his life he had an audience with Nebuchadnezzar (how he got there is an amusing story in its own right) and explained to him the answers of such philosophical questions as:

• Why were farts created? (Ben Sira also cured Nebuchadnezzar's daughter who had a thousand every hour. And you thought I had a hard time dating)


• Why does the ox not have hair under its nose?


• Why does the cat eat the mouse and not other rodents?


• Why are the cat and dog enemies? (Thus explaining the history of cartoons in the process)

Remember that the guy asking these questions went on to command the army which destroyed the temple. For some reason, I would think he had more important things on his mind...or not.

Anyway, if you ever have two hours on the subway, The Alphabet of Ben Sira and Rabbinic Fantasies are highly recommended.

Posted by Josh at 7:49 PM | Permalink | Comments (2)

Prelude

When I first mentioned that I would be a panelist discussing Egalitarian Liturgy, the immediate reaction I got was cynical to say the least. "Why would I want to get into that," and "you're being railroaded" were just two of the comments reflecting the broad sentiment. Initially, I too was skeptical for probably the same reasons.

First, the word "Egalitarian" recalls the classic conservative vs. orthodox debates, and is oftne employed by those with specific agendas. ¹ However, knowing the nature of the Hillel, and after speaking to the Rabbi, it seemed obvious to me that the panel would be cordial and informative.

Some questions still remain: why take the chance or why bother with this at all? It's a good quesiton; one which requires its own post.

Later.

The Ideological Conflict

I do not want to discuss the details of the other panelists' positions, mainly because I do not want to misrepresent them. However, I can present my own take on egalitarian liturgy and how I presented it in the discussion.

I did not like the title of the panel. The term "ethical" presupposes the discussion is a moral one - that there is some inherent value towards egalitarianism to which all people are subsumed. While there is a value to egalitarianism, I do not see it as an "ethical" imperative, but rather as a "religious" imperative. For the sake of this essay, I will define "religious imperatives" as requirements necessarily for the sufficient observance of one�s faith.

As one of the other panelists correctly noted, the word "liturgy" is not limited to prayer, but it includes all manners of public worship. When discussing inequalities in Jewish liturgy, the most blatant example is the role of the woman. ² Women are relegated to sitting behind a mehitza restricting them from active participation. Furthermore, several prayers themselves are not amiable to many women. How can one properly worship when s/he³ is excluded from the primary religious mechanisms? This is a religious imperative.

However, there is a conflicting religious imperative: to maintain "The Tradition." The current actions of the community - following the practices of the previous generations - are as canonical as the Torah itself. It is arrogant at best � heretical at worst � to alter the practices of the previous generations.

Advocates of Egalitarianism could rightly point to the fact that liturgy has changed over time. Piyutim were added throughout the middle ages, many in response to actual events.⁴ For the proponents of tradition, the changes that happened in the past are valid, but we today have no right - or minimal right to make any further emendations. Furthermore, the nature of some of the changes currently suggested affect essential parts of the prayer service.

Specifics

To further understand this debate, we will have to examine some of the specific examples of the offending elements of Jewish liturgy.

I discussed the specific issue of prayer � the colloquial use of the term "liturgy." I noticed two categories of non-egalitarian prayer. The fist involves language of explicit or implicit exclusion. For example, "bessed are you...that you did not make me a woman" is obviously exclusive of women. Other prayers exclude wicked people; in the amida prayer "velamalshinim" excludes heretics. An implicit exclusion would be the yekum purkan prayer which blesses �the congregation and their women and children� � implying that the women are not part of the community.

The other examples of non-egalitarian prayer do not excluded the petitioner, but somehow make the prayers inaccessible to the petitioner. "God" is most often referred to in the masculine. Or the use of the avot, the fathers and not the imahot, the mothers.

For the proponents of egalitarian liturgy, these types of passages exclude either the prayers from the individuals, or the individuals from the prayers.

Solutions?

Can there be a harmonious solution between the two conflicting religious imperatives? Regarding the issue of God language, I suggest that the imperative could be not to modify the language at all. According to all parties involved, God is supposed to be a non-gender. The Hebrew language lacks a gender-neutral conjugation; the masculine gender is used by default. By making a point of including feminine God language, one removes the neutral aspects of the masculine and instead emphasizes the gender. I will also theorize that this might have more of an impact on those communities who pray in English. The constant use of "Him" or "His" will have a greater impact on those who pray in Hebrew and will not be as sensitive to the masculine usage.

For the other changes, one would have to consider the nature of the prayer being modified. Of the passages mentioned, emmending the yekum purkan would be the most plausible since it would have the least effect on the tradition. Few people would notice the change - assuming they know the aramaic and say all the words - and even if a community would still reject this change for themselves, they would not reject other communities who would adopt this change.⁵

Regarding the Amida, I cannot anticipate any substantive changes in the current siddurim. However, halakhically, it might be possible - if not preferable - to personalize the silent amida.⁶ The petitioner will then have the religious meaning while remaining in the halakhic tradition, and assuming the petitioner uses some discretion, s/he will not offend the social tradition.

Conclusion

Throughout the Jewish history, Rishonim and Achronim have reinterpreted Jewish laws to reflect the religious needs of the community.⁷ However, due to the fragmented nature of the Jewish community, there are rarely new religious needs which are applicable to all. It is not surprising that different communities will have different needs. Therefore, I cannot claim that there is a universal religious imperative for egalitarian prayer. I can say that it exists for certain individuals throughout all communities, and for separate communities themselves. However, so is the religious imperative of "Tradition" equally applicable across the spectrum of Judaism. When faced with this conflict, it is up to the communities to reconcile them for themselves. Each has free will to decide which imperative will take precedence. However, in the areas of conflict, both sides must realize there will be consequences � most often the ostracization of one community by another. This too is a religious imperative - and perhaps the real ethical imperative.

Posted by Josh at 10:49 AM | Permalink | Comments (2)

In one of the more enlightening distractions of the day, I had a long conversation with the Elder Avraham on the nature and merits of forgiveness. The specific issue at hand was a recent Dr. Laura column in which she tells her readers "Don't be so quick to forgive" because "knee-jerk forgiveness...will likely make you feel less important and make your pain feel inconsequential. " In one example, she describes a caller who's sister had an affair with her husband. Although the sister never expressed remorse, the father wanted the caller to forgive her sister for the sake of "peace" in the family.

On the other hand, it's clearly not healthy if not prohibited (Lev. 19:18) to bear the grudge. Avraham was reading some texts for Kavvanah which apparently encouraged the offended party to forgive more easily.

How can we then reconcile two conflicting values? What is the middle ground between not becoming obsessed with revenge or self-pity, and not becoming a doormat?

There are several factors to consider. First, what is the nature of the offense? Eating someone's donut should be easier to forgive than adultery. Not all offenses are equal in their severity and therefore not all forgiveness are equal in their absolution. Second, what is the nature of the apology? Is the offender sorry that s/he committed the wrong or that s/he got caught? Furthermore, there is a difference between saying "sorry" and being sorry. An empty apology serves the offender more than the victim as it gives the offender a sense of absolution and it obviates the guilt. A sincere apology would not only include remorse, but some matter of restitution if possible.

During the IM conversation, Avraham and I reached a similar conclusion from different perspectives. On one hand, a person should not be consumed by hatred, and on the other, shouldn't be so quick to absolve the offender. Emotional wounds, like physical ones, take time to heal. The more severe the wound, the longer the recuperation. Just as discharging onesself from the hospital too early can have lasting physical effects, so can forgiving a person before s/he is ready. Therefore following this analogy, a person must come to terms with the action before any forgiveness may be given.

Sometimes we are too quick to forgive, or even worse, we're expected to forgive. People feel obligated to forgive before they're ready and consequently feel guilty in addition to whatever pain they have suffered. This forgiveness serves the offender more than the victim and is as empty as many apologies. This doesn't mean a person should be consumed by the pain. Quite the contrary - s/he must undergo the process of healing. This process will vary from person to person and from offense to offense, but in all cases, it must be performed. Only when a person has "healed thyself" can forgiveness truly be given - and received.

Posted by Josh at 8:40 PM | Permalink | Comments (2)

We're in the "Marxism" section of the required "Perspectives in Social Science Analysis" class. If you've never read Marx inside, let me warn you it's some of the most boring dense reading out there. Anyway, in one of his rants on alienation, Marx claims "all objects become for him objectifications of himself." (not in the linked page, but you get the idea) Basically, when man produces an object, he invests part of himself - his essense - into creating this object. Thus, part of his essense is now "alienated" from himself, which for Marx is one of the worst things imaginable.

As I recall, the Keddushat Levi has a similar approach in explaining mishloah manot but with a positive spin. (Surprise - I do learn hassidut on occasion). Like Marx, he views the mishloach manot as the fruits of one's labor, and consequently giving someone mishloach manot implies giving someone else a part of yourself. However, whereas Marx emphasizes the alienation factor of man losing himself, Keddushat Levi stresses the community building process of receiving the other.

This got me thinking that for all Marx talks about alienation and what the worker loses, I haven't seen him discuss where the worker gets anything back. If a worker produces something in which he invests himself, and someone else acquires said object then following the Marxian analogy that person has also acquired the essense of someone else. Thus it's not simply man losing his essence, but he is necesarilly gaining others in his role as a consumer.

I guess now would be the time to write a warm fuzzy derasha on the individual and his larger role in the community for Marxian and Hassidic thought. I have too much reading to do tonight, so I leave this as an excersize for the reader.

Posted by Josh at 1:51 PM | Permalink | Comments (1)

Rabbi Dr. Jacob Neusner writes an opinion piece lamenting the lack of scholarship in the Rabbinate across all denominations. Protocols covered the editorial and it was met with some criticism from the Elder Avraham. I quickly posted a comment, but I feel this topic deserves some extra attention.

First, consider the different perspectives of Prof. Neusner, and Avraham. Prof. Neusner is an academic and so he thinks like an academic, valuing the formative intellectual development a PhD provides. (Although he has ordination from JTS, he is more known for his numerous writings than his pastoral skills). Second, Professor Neusner comes from a different generation where almost all Rabbis had PhD's or equivilant degrees. Nowadays, they are a rarity. (As I mentioned in my comment, R. Aharon Rakeffet-Rothkoff made a similar observation in one of his classes in Gruss). Today's Rabbis - or at least from what I've seen of those leaving YU - are as a whole less knowledgeable, less worldly, and less thoughtful than the rabbis of the previous generation.

Avraham's response (aside from the dig at Neusner's own acceptance in the academic field - a debatable point in its own right) is that it doesn't really matter for the average pulpit rabbi. Most congregations would not want to sit through an hour long dissertation comparing Sir Isaac Newton and Maimonides. Many congregants are either unable or unwilling to concentrate on complex ideas before mussaf, especially if their tired and/or hungry. Assuming people are paying attention, you also have to be careful in terms of how far you can interpret. I once got flack for interpreting Leah as in some ways superior to Rachel. My sense is that most congregants are not interested in serious intellectual stimulation, or at least not at the level which requires a PhD education.

Consider the following quote from Neusner's editorial: "But they stand for a religious system and are woefully unprepared to carry out their intellectual tasks." [emphasis mine] It is this point where the divergence occurs. Neusner's concept of the role of the Rabbi is different than Avraham. While at one point the Rabbi was looked upon as an intellectual as well as a religious leader, today most rabbis are simply pastors (although many would like a larger role). Perhaps Neusner is also lamenting the diminished role of the Rabbi as well (ignoring for the moment the question of causation).

Avraham is correct in that academic credentials are not essential for many pulpits. I'm sure many rabbis can go through their careers and not be seriously challenged intellectually. However, I think Neusner is correct that to some extent Rabbis do still stand for a religious system. I say this because as a Rabbi, I get questions about every aspect of Judaism - halakha and hashkafa. On some level I'm expected to know everything - otherwise people wouldn't think of asking the Rabbi. I am viewed by others as someone who has, or more importantly should have all the answers. As I'm sure Avraham will agree, the RIETS education is hardly that thorough.

For a more specific example, assume a congregant goes off to a secular college and is exposed to bible criticism for the first time. The bewildered student then turns to his/her rabbi for some reconciliation. How can the rabbi respond effectively? Telling the student to drop the heretical class will not be helpful as it doesn't answer any of the arguments. Nor would resorting to blind faith quell the student's conflict. In order for an Orthodox rabbi to seriously answer this question, he must know the bible criticism as well as the critics, and know enough to formulate an intelligent response.

PhD's are not magic pills which bestow knowledge - rather it is the culmination of a process of intellectual growth. Although the topic of one's dissertation might never come up in one's pulpit, minimally, the analytical skills will assist the Rabbi in formulating and articulating intelligent responses to the most difficult questions.

I'd like to add that I am turning into my father. Not that this is a bad thing, just a little scary.

Posted by Josh at 1:49 PM | Permalink | Comments (1)

Continuing my "Greatest Hits" blogging (while moving away from the Purim Torah), I wanted to revisit my Pluralism Equation. During my second year of smikha, I participated in Clal's Rabbinic Internship Program. One of the goals of this program was to promote pluralistic dialogue between the various denominations, and they accepted a diverse group of students. In addition to myself, my group consisted of one student from Chovevei Torah, one student from Drisha (though not techinically a "rabbinical" student), one student from AJR, one from RRC, two from JTS, and two from HUC (one of whom graduated Cardozo Law School which makes him a YU graduate).

Dealing with controversial issues usually leads to heated conversations which are usually not productive. Instread, we spent the first half of the year gradually getting to know each other before we got to the serious and sensitive subjects. Furthermore, even before we began to discuss the issues, we were asked to create ground rules for our pluralistic dialogue to avoid inadvertanly offending each other. I don't remember if anything specific was said which prompted me to write the following, but I felt the need to express my throught on pluralism in general. The following is a slightly modified version of what I submitted as a premise to my "Rules of Engagement."

The Pluralism Equation
Before we can discuss the rules for �pluralism� discussions, we must first understand that essentially, all such definitions of �tolerance� or �acceptance� as it relates to pluralism are fundamentally the same. Every Jewish movement has its positions and every individual has his/her own interpretation of those positions. I will argue that for any given movement, or any given interpretation, there must exist some position(s) which will be considered �beyond the pale� of what is acceptable. If a movement defines itself as �Jewish� then it places certain restrictions or limitations on itself to justify that definition.

Allow me to demonstrate:

Let y[] be the set of all possible ideas. The set of ideas which cannot be tolerated or accepted, for lack of a better term I will call such ideas �bad,�¹ will be represented as x[]. The contents of x[] will vary from denomination to denomination, and person to person.
P[luralism] is then the acceptance of the set of all ideas minus the set of bad ideas. Our formula may then be written as

y[] = [0..inf]
x[] = [bad₀..bad_n] // Any set of someone�s �bad� things.
P = y[] � x[]

All movements and all denominations must follow this formula. In order for this formula to be significantly different, the set x[] must be empty in which case a movement or individual is accepting/tolerant of all possible ideas. Since this is extremely unlikely if not impossible,² x[] will have a size of at least 1 and the equation remains meaningful. As long as there is something bad in x[], there is something which we do not accept/tolerate, we are placing our own defined restrictions on others. Although the size and contents of x[] may vary, the result is the same: people will accept/tolerate everything up to an arbitrary point.

This holds true for the different denominations of Judaism. The crux of this pluralism debate is twofold: The contents of x[] as it relates to Judaism as a religion and the contents of x[] as it relates to what is unacceptable opinions for discourse. Regarding x[] as it relates to Judaism, there must be some ideas which cannot be compatible with Judaism. Or for example, the idea of human sacrifices would not be acceptable/tolerated according to any of the Jewish movements. The same equation can be applied to the dialogue itself: a group will have discussions with another, provided certain conditions are met. Complete �pluralism� in this sense cannot exist. The point of this is to realize that everyone has their own standards and their own breaking points or �red lines� and therefore will have their own ultimatums for acceptance/tolerance. Therefore �pluralism� requires 1) acknowledging that we all have our own boundaries and 2) recognizing each individual�s boundaries. I have included a sheet to keep track of each individual�s boundaries.³ Questions and comments should be customized to the individual.

1. In that it is bad for an individual�s or a limited collective�s definition of Judaism, not in any objective global sense. For example, eating pork isn�t objectively bad, but it is unacceptable for some Jews.
2. Any system which is accepting/tolerant of all possible ideas would be nihilistic and anarchistic.
3. Note that this does not imply agreement, acceptance/tolerance, or legitimization for specific opinions.

Redux - not in the original submission
I don't think I said anything new in this piece and I would be surprised if I found out I was the first person who said this (maybe not in this exact style, but I guess I was still feeling the effects of Discrete Structures). At any rate, I do get annoyed when I am told I "ought" to be more pluralistic since in essence I am being denied the very right to formulate my own opinions in deference to others. For example, one of the Clal memebers didn't understand why Reform conversions were not accepted in Israel since after all, "we're all Jews." Not getting into the religious/political dynamic of Israel, if someone wants the right to define who is a Jew in his/her own way then that is their free will to do so. However, if one person or group wants the ability to define who is a Jew on the grounds of Pluralism, then they cannot deny the rights of others to do the same even if their definitions are mutually exclusive.

I remember R. Lamm writing someplace that if tolerance isn't when you can see two legitimate opinions - that would be not making up your mind. Tolerance is when you firmly belive in something and can deal with others who disagree. You can therefore be an Orthodox pluralist and not be apologetic. You can give people the right to different opinions, and retain your right to your own. The nature and tone of the dialogue is not unique to religion, but basic civility of discourse.

Update: R. Lamm discussed pluralism at one of YU's Dorm Talks not too long ago. Thanks Avraham!

Posted by Josh at 1:36 PM | Permalink

The New York Post has an interesting exchange between Mr. Taheri and some Muslim readers displeased with his article on the Hijab.

I can't say I'm terribly surprised at the reaction or the response. A traditional religious mindset is challenged by a modern rational position. Compare this discussion in the Islamic world to the attitudes expressed in contemporary literature on women's issues in Judaism.

Posted by Josh at 12:15 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Danny Hirshtal sends in an insightful piece from National Post regarding the Hijab - the headgear of Muslim women.

It's a fascinating read, although I'm not sure how accurate it is. For example, the author claims, "It is not sanctioned anywhere in the Koran, the fundamental text of Islam, or the hadith (traditions) attributed to the Prophet."

However, as cited in the above link, Qur'an 33:59 states, "O Prophet, tell your wives and daughters and the believing women to draw their outer garments around them (when they go out or are among men). That is better in order that they may be known (to be Muslims) and not annoyed..."

While the Hijab might not have been mentioned by name, and could have been instituted in the 70's, it's not such a stretch to make this "midrash halakha." Also, I'm sure there are excellent comparisons to the laws and customs of Jewish headcoverings for both men and women. I find it interested that from one perspective the Hijab is a sign of "aparthied" but from another it represents a positive religious experience.

No doubt there is some social conditioning on both sides. Perhaps I can revisit this issue when I get to Chicago.

Posted by Josh at 12:10 PM | Permalink

The following was given as a shiur of a given on 9 Av 5763, Aug 7th 2003

Introduction

For those of you who haven't been following this blog, I'll give you a quick recap. A week ago, someone asked me what happened on 9 Av. My first resposne was quoting M. Ta'anit 4:6. She then asked what else happened on 9 Av, meaning event that happened later in Jewish history - the Spanish Expiulsion and World War I (WWI) in particular. Not being confident to answer either way at that time, I started doing research.

Ohr Torah has a thorough chart of these events. For reasons which will be explained later, I will divide these events into three categories:

• Hazal - M. Ta'anit 4:6
1. Decree that the dor ha-midbar wouldn't enter Eretz Yisrael
2. Hurban I
3. Hurban II
4. Beitar destroyed
5. Yerushalayim destroyed


• Post-Hazal, Pre-1792
1. First Crusade
2. English Expulsion
3. Spanish Expulsion


• Post-1792
1. Start of World War I (WWI)
2. Liquidation of the Warsaw Ghetto
3. Iraq Walks out of Talks with Kuwait
4. AMIA Bombing in Argentina

Hazal

M. Taanit 4:6 lists the more "traditional" events for which we mourn on 9 Av. The Gemara (bTan 29a) attempts to prove the accuracy of the Mishna's statement through available canonical material. Although there is no specific date given for narrative of the spies, the gemara uses the verses to count from the days which are given, and come up with 8 Av. Rabba citing R. Yonahan explains that the spies came back on the 8th, and the events actually happened on the 9th.

There are two verses in the Navi which give dates for the first hurban. II Melakhim 25:8 (can't find Hebrew searchable on-line nach) has the first hurban happening on the 7th day of the 5th month(5th month being Av, Nissan being the first). Yirmiyahu 52:12 says the hurban happened on the 10th of the month. So, not only are these dates not consistent, but neither one matches 9 Av. The Gemara explains that the Temple was breached on the 7th, started burning on the end of the 9th, with the majority of the destruction occuring on the 10th. Although R. Yohanan would have had the mourning on the 10th, the Rabbis legislated that we mourn at the beginning of the destruction - 9 Av.

There are no biblical sources for the remaining three events, and hazal do not even ask the question minalan - from where do we know this - for the final event. For the second hurban the Gemara simple states that we "roll over" positive events to positive days and negative events to negative days and for Beitar the Gemara simply says that it's a "gemara" or tradition.

Post-Hazal, Pre 1752

After the time of Hazal, we have a more accessible calendar which makes it easier to determine what happened when. An excellent program for converting Hebrew and English calendars is Hebcal. However, this program does not take into account the switch from the Gregorian to Julian system and will return the following message:

WARNING: Results for year 1752 C.E. and before may not be accurate. Hebcal does not take into account a correction of ten days that was introduced by Pope Gregory XIII known as the Gregorian Reformation.

Despite Hebcal's limitations, it is possible to do the calculation manually by following the Papal Bull of February 1582.

Date Range	Divided By 400	Difference of Days
1900	4.75	-13
1800	4.5	-12
1700	4.25	-11
1600	4	-10
1500	3.75	-10
1400	3.5	-9
1300	3.25	-8
1200	3	-8
1100	2.75	-7
1000	2.5	-6

Of course, following this pattern tapers off towards the end.

There is another excelent downloadable program called Kaluach which does compute the Hebrew dates for the Julian calendar, but I cannot confirm how accurate it is.

Despite the complication in the calendar systems, some events are obviously way off. Pope Urban II issued his proclamation starting the first Crusade on November 27th 1095 - a few months after 9 Av.

The Jews were expelled from England on July 18th 1290. Hebcal returns 2 Av 5050, but Kaluach does indeed give us 9 Av. (I don't see an on-line interface to provide a link, but you can download the program and run the tests yourself.

The edict expelling the Jews from Spain was signed on March 30th 1492 set to take effect on July 30th. Kaluach returns 2 Nissan 5252 for March 30th and 6 Av for July 30th. If we rely on Kaluach for the English Expulsion, we cannot accept that the Spanish Expulsion also took place on 9 Av.

Post-1752

The start of WWI easily falls within Hebcal's range. The question is which date should we use? Archduke Ferdinand was assasinated on June, 28th 1914. This translates to 4 Tammuz 5674.

The first formal declaration of war came on July 28th when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Hebcal returns 5 Av.

Russia mobilizes against Austria and on July 31 (8 Av), Germany gives Russia an ultimatum to either disarm or face war. Due to Russia's refusal, Germany formally declared war on Russia on Aug 1st. This was in fact 9 Av. The fighting began on Aug 2nd when Germany invaded Luxembourg, and Britain joined in on Aug 4th (this blogger's B-Day) when Germany invaded Belgium.

So the first declaration of war came on June 28th and fighting actually began on Aug 2nd. Neither one of which is 9 Av.

The liquidation of the Warsaw Ghetto began on July 22nd 1942 (Also see the timelines of The Raoul Wallenberg Museum, Bronx School of Science. Yad Vashem only says the deportations started sometime in July with no specific date.)

However July 22nd 1942 returns 8 Av 5702 - unless they started after sunset.

The uprising began on April 19th 1943 (14 Nissan 5703) and ended on May 16th (11 Iyyar). The Warsaw Ghetto was ultimately destroyed on June 3rd 1943 or 29 Iyyar.

I haven't been able to confirm the date of the Iraq / Kuwait talks. War was actually declared on August 2, 1990, or 11 Av 5750.

The AMIA bombing took place on July 18th 1994 or 10 Av 5754.

What does this all mean?

Overall, we hardly have a convincing set of 9 Av events. But why does any of this matter? What's the big deal? So it's off by a day or two - who cares?

Since I've started this project, I've gotten these and numerous related questions. So why am I making such a big deal about this?

Historical Accuracy
First, I think there is merit simply in getting history straight, especically that which is easily verifiable. Deut. 32:7 tells us to remember the days of the world. Lev. 19:11 prohibits lying and Ex. 23:7 commands to "stay far away" from falsehood. Some might argue that all history is didactic - the lessons of history are more important than the facts themselves. However, if a lesson is predicated on innacurate data, the lesson is lost when the truth is discovered.

Or as quoted to me in the name of Jacob Neusner, "You can't make good theology from bad facts."

Cheapening 9 Av and the Events
Again assuming that history is merely didactic and meant to teach lessons as opposed to facts we must also consider the unintended consequences. Presumeably, the reason why we would try to fit other events into 9 Av is to give more significance to 9 Av - it demonstrates the auspiciousness of 9 Av throughout Jewish History. However, the very need to add more significance to 9 Av implies that there isn't enough significance on its own. 9 Av is somehow lacking, and we need to make it more meaningful. Furthermore, the events themselves become more meaningful because the happened on 9 Av - again implying that these events aren't intrinsicly important, but need the added bonus of occuring on 9 Av. And what of the other tragedies that didn't happen on 9 Av? Are they somehow less important?

This is not to say that we should not connect the tragedies of Jewish History to 9 Av. On the contrary, we are so far removed from the Hurban that we would need some tragedy in our own lives to begin to grasp what it's like. Those in the European shtetl during the Crusades and Holocaust knew destruction. They experienced and internalized descruction. For them, remembering the Hurban is something real.

Distorting history for a derasha is a gimmick which cheapens both the day and the events.

Differences Between Hazal and Us
Although it might seem that in the modern era we've done nothing different than the rabbis of the Mishna, I think that there are some important distinctions to be made. The Mishna was written in the shadow of the Hurban, painfully aware of its consequences. The examples given are not random tragedies; they all relate to losing Eretz Yisrael. The Mishna was not written in a vacuum, but was speaking to the Jews of its time. I think the Gemara understood this in its analyisis. The Gemara starts by meticulously calculating the date of the Spies and ends not even asking the about the date Yerushalayim was destroyed. They could have had a tradtion, being close enough to the events, that they didn't need to justify the dates. They were common knowledge. Or perhaps they realized that ultimately, the dates are not important.

The Forgotten Message of 9 Av
This religious revisionism is not an isolated phenomenon but part of a larger pattern in Judaism - the worshipping of symbols. We know that the 9 Av is a terrible day initially because of the hurban. But over time, 9 Av takes on a life of its own as a day of tragedy for the Jewish people. We get sidetracked from the meaning of the hurban and instead take a fatalistic approach to the day - that it is a day of tragedy. 9 Av is inherently infamous, and the hurban is relegated to just another event which happened.

Another example of this phenomenon is how we treat the halakhot of the three weeks / 9 days. According to the Gemara (bTan 29b - 30a) the only prohibitions during this time are against laundry and haircutting and these only apply for the week preceeding 9 Av. However, various customs have arisen including prohibiting eating meat and listening to music. These extra prohibitions presumably help us feel the loss of the Temple.

Assuming we follow the tradition that the temple was destroyed because of sinat hinam - baseless hatred - then how does not eating meat or listening to music help? Most people I've asked admitted that they would think less of someone who violated these customs of mourning. Ironically these customs which were created to help feel the hurban engender the feelings which destroyed it in the first place. The ultimate meaning of the Hurban gets lost in the symbols we've created.

Conclusion

In the Haftara we read the shabbat before 9 Av, Yeshayahu Ha-Navi chastizes Israel for essentially missing the point of their religion. Benei Yisrael were giving the sacrifices and performing all the rituals, but they were morally corrupt. Like we do today, Israel subsituded external rituals for internal commitment.

It's easy to accept prohibitions and to have it look like we're doing it for God. It's much harder look within ourselves and try to change and improve ourselves - as individuals and as a community - to undo the hurban for which we are mourning.

Posted by Josh at 11:15 AM | Permalink | Comments (8)

Real quick posting today. There's an editorial in the NYTimes today lamenting the increase in the prison population.

"Federal, state and local governments have been putting more people behind bars even though crime, including violent crime, is down sharply. The driving force has been an array of get-tough policies, many adopted in another era, when fear of crime was greater." [emphasis mine]

In case you're not following the logic, the Times is suggesting that since crime is down, we don't need to be so aggressive in inaceration. The Times avoids making the correlation that perhaps crime is down because of the very policies it decries.

An alternative the Times suggests:

"And special attention should be given to releasing older inmates, a fast-growing part of the prisoner population."

Perhaps the reason the older inmates are a fast growing part of the population is because they commited heinous crimes in their youth and consequently received lenthy prison terms. After all, isn't prison more humane than the dealth penalty?

One would think with the way physics work these days that all inmates get older over time, thus increasing the population, and perhaps they actually deserve to be locked up - or we deserve not to have lunatics running around on the streets.

Update: This link was accepted to OpinionJournal's Best of the Web.

Posted by Josh at 11:01 AM | Permalink | Comments (1)

I've been getting swamped with e-mails and IM's about the historical accuracy of 9 Av events. Even Protocols is getting in on the action.

This is going to take much longer to explain - including the possiblity of adjusting for Hebcal's limitation of 1752. Basically, this is getting way out of hand for blogging right now.

I think this topic of historical accuracy and religious significance of 9 Av will make for a good topic for my 9 Av shiur at the Bridge Shul.

That should also allow me to think things through better and hopefully elliminate the need for several blogs updating or correcting one topic.

Posted by Josh at 11:12 AM | Permalink

Abdicate.net gives us a few other infamous events which took place on 9 Av, all of which "are verifiable in the history books.". We already demonstrated the WWI date to be wrong. The only other event which we can verify with Hebcal is the liquidation of the Warsaw Ghetto. Abdicate.net gives us July 10th 1942 as the day deportations began. This however corresponds to 25 Tammuz 5702.

From quick net research, I'm seeing the liquidation began on July 22nd 1942 (Also see the timelines of The Raoul Wallenberg Museum, Bronx School of Science. Yad Vashem only says the deportations started sometime in July with no specific date.)

However July 22nd 1942 returns 8 Av 5702 - unless they started after sunset.

The uprising began on April 19th 1943 (14 Nissan 5703) and ended on May 16th (11 Iyyar). The Warsaw Ghetto was ultimately destroyed on June 3rd 1943 or 29 Iyyar.

And as always, if anyone out there catches a mistake, please let me know.

You may be wondering why I'm making such a big deal of this. These are horribly tragic events in Jewish history. Does it really matter whether or not they actually happened on 9 Av exactly?

I think so.

Will explain in a later post.

Posted by Josh at 11:09 AM | Permalink

Someone asked me tonight about what happened on 9 av. M. Taanit 4:6 lists 5 things:

1. Decree that the dor midbar wouldn't enter Eretz Yisrael


2. Hurban I


3. Hurban II


4. Beitar destroyed


5. Yerushalayim destroyed

But I was also asked about other later historical events, like the Spanish expulsion and WWI. Did these events occur (or start) on 9 Av? Let's put it to the test with some help from our good freinds at Hebcal. (What can I say, I'm a skeptic).

The Spanish Expulsion
The edict expelling the Jews was signed on July 30th 1492. Hebcal returns 26 Tamuz, 5252 but with the following disclaimer:

"WARNING: Results for year 1752 C.E. and before may not be accurate. Hebcal does not take into account a correction of ten days that was introduced by Pope Gregory XIII known as the Gregorian Reformation. "

Hebcal also includes a nice link with all the Gregorian details. (Hey, it's my blog and I haven't had any really horrible puns yet).

So as far as the expulsion in concerned, Hebcal can't help us. Any math majors out there who want to figure this out?

WWI Corrected
The start of WWI easily falls within Hebcal's range. The question is which date should we use? Archduke Ferdinand was assasinated on June, 28th 1914. This translates to 4 Tammuz 5674.

The first formal declaration of war came on July 28th when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Hebcal returns 5 Av.

Russia mobilizes against Austria and on July 31 (8 Av), Germany gives Russia an ultimatum to either disarm or face war. Due to Russia's refusal, Germany formally declared war on Russia on Aug 1st. This was in fact 9 Av. The fighting began on Aug 2nd when Germany invaded Luxembourg, and Britain joined in on Aug 4th (this blogger's B-Day) when Germany invaded Belgium.

So the first declaration of war came on June 28th and fighting actually began on Aug 2nd. Neither one of which is 9 Av.

Many thanks to Maxim Smyrnyi for the correction!

End result: One inconclusive, and one close but no cigar.

BTW - I'd love to hear from math or history buffs out there who could provide any more info and/or correct any mistakes I made.

Posted by Josh at 11:05 AM | Permalink

Interesting mahloket in the Islamic world. In 2000 an Alexandrian court ruled that Islam doesn't accept electronic communications for divorce. Malaysia, however, authorized the use of SMS as a legitimate medium. This seems to be an official pesak and would carry more weight than the acts of individuals.

Acc to Islamic law, a husband divorces his wife by telling her "I divorce thee" three times. So, are electronic communications ok for this?

Topics for discussion:

• What are the nafka minot between SMS and e-mail?


• Would this work for AOL's Instant Messenger?


• Can the husband do this over the phone, since the technology converts his voice into electronic pulses? Is it a din in the voice or a din in the da'as haba'al?


• If it's an electonic communication, does the husband have to type the whole message three times, or can he type it once and just send the same message three times? Is it talui on the shlichus or kabbalah?


• What does this mean for the Da'as Torah of the Moetzet Gedolei Ha-Quran?

My bekiut in Islam is admitedly weak, so any comments would be appreciated.

Posted by Josh at 11:03 AM | Permalink

Othniel Askew, who murdered political rival Councilman James Davis, was afraid of being blackmailed for being Gay.

On the other hand, he refused to donate his internal organs:

"In his pocket, the officials said, the 31-year-old Askew carried a card that said, 'I am not an organ donor. I am Jewish.' Orthodox Jews frown upon organ donations."

Apparently homosexuality and murder aren't as "frowned upon."

Thanks to Reuven Weiser for the correction

Posted by Josh at 10:57 AM | Permalink | Comments (1)